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Abstract 
One inference from game theory models of animal conflict is that adversaries should not inform 
one another about concealed components of their fighting ability. This poses a paradox for the 
customary ethological account of aggressive displays in that it is usually assumed that the primary 
function of such behavior is to make such information available. To resolve the paradox, I propose 
that the information in aggressive displays may not be strictly truthful, but may instead represent 
"optimal deceit," a balance between the advantages of deceit or bluffing and the disadvantages of 
selecting for skepticism in the receiver. Numerical simulation of this model was performed to examine 
the effects of differences in fighting ability and in the risk of injury in an escalated conflict. The model 
converged on an equilibrium level of deceit, even when the receiver was ignorant of the average level 
of deception being employed. 
Introduction 
Fighting that can result in serious injuries does occur during animal conflicts 
(GEIST 1974). One of the principal insights of classical ethology, however, was 
that it does not invariably occur. Many animal conflicts appear to be resolved 
solely on the basis of aggressive displays. Display has, thus, customarily been 
viewed as a substitute for combat, an alternative and less hazardous means of 
assessing aggressive superiority (TINBERGEN 1951). 
Accordingly, conflict resolution by display and by fighting should yield 
similar outcomes. An individual that would have been defeated in actual combat 
should not generally be able to win through display alone. Displays must, 
therefore, provide a truthful rendering of aggressive attributes, in that they must 
be roughly predictive of the animal's performance in actual combat. Thus, the 
L.S. Copyright Clearance Center Code S~atement: 0179-16I3/89/8IOI-OO29$O2.5O/O 
central function of aggressive display, in the customary view, is the affordance of 
information about the aggressive capabilities and dispositions of the displaying 
individual. In SMITH'S (1977) words, displays are "acts specialized to make 
information available." 
Some of the information provided by displays, such as an animal's sex or  
size, may be implicit in the physical appearance of the displaying individual. 
DAWKINS & KREBS (1978) have pointed out that aggressive displays often consti- 
tute feats of strength, agility, or endurance and may, therefore, also provide 
information about these attributes. Success in aggressive interactions often 
depends on other, less conspicuous factors, however, such as an individual's prior 
experience, its social status, its current level of arousal, its willingness to persist in 
combat, or the level of injury it is capable of sustaining. 
Such experiential or dispositional attributes are not commonly exhibited 
directly in the performance of a display. In many animals, however, the relevant 
information seems to be encoded in the form and frequency of display behavior. 
The remarkable diversity of aggressive displays, in contrast to the small number 
of behaviorial events involved in nonagonistic interactions (ANDERSSON 198O), 
strongly suggests a diversity in meanings related to concealed attributes. This 
inference is supported by the fact that different aggressive displays are commonly 
seen to be associated with differing degrees of likelihood of attack or  withdrawal 
in the contest (TINBERGEN 1959; HINDE 1981). The complex of displays thus 
provides a "graded signal" of aggressive intensity, a concept with a respectable 
history in the ethological literature (SMITH 1977). 
These customary interpretations of aggressive display have recently been 
strongly disputed by a group of theorists concerned with the evolution of display 
behavior. The argument was orginally developed by MAYNARD SMITH (1972, 
1974). He conceptualized animal conflict as a two-person game in which each 
participant chooses among a number of possible strategies. The strategies vary in 
their potential fitness costs from low-risk alternatives, involving only display 
behavior, to "escalated" fighting that entails actual physical combat. The choices 
are presumed to be made on the basis of their expected net fitness payoffs. Each 
individual, in this perspective, is seen as attempting to maximize its access to 
resources and minimize its risk of injurious combat by manipulating the informa- 
tion available to its opponent. 
The game formalism divides the attributes of the participants into two 
groupings: those that contribute to an underlying difference in relative fighting 
ability ("resource holding potential" in PARKER'S [I9741 terminology) that would 
determine the outcome if the interaction were to be escalated; and those that 
reflect the individual's choice of strategy (its motivation or  aggressive "inten- 
tions"). Through similar but independent lines of argument addressed to each of 
these groupings, game theorists have concluded that there is no selective pressure 
favoring truthfulness in aggressive displays with respect to either fighting ability 
or motivation. 
The argument concerned with fighting ability, which is the central focus of 
this paper, will be referred to as "the Natural Superiority of Deceit." It has been 
advanced, apparently independently, by a number of different authors (DAWKINS 
Optimal Deceit in Aggressive Displays 31 
& KREHS 1978; MAYNARD SMITH & PARKER 1976; CARYL 1979; ZAHAVI 1977). The 
argument asserts that truthful communication about capability, if its veracity is 
not compelled by physical appearance or implicit in the difficulty of the display, 
is open to unlimited exploitation by deceitful individuals. 
Their reasoning is as follows. If the mere appearance of aggressiveness will 
significantly increase the probability of winning, then all individuals should adopt 
an aggressive appearance, without regard to their true capabilities. Selection will, 
therefore, drive the system to a state in which all individuals invariably display the 
maximum degree of aggressiveness, at which point the display becomes effec- 
tively meaningless. Note that this argument does not assert that noninformative 
displaJ-s are necessarily deceptive (MITCHELL 1986), but that a continuous selec- 
tion for misleading displays will eventually render them noninformative. The 
conclusion has been that whenever independent confirmation of an animal's 
ability is lacking, natural selection will inevitably assure a noninformative display. 
The game theoretic argument thus poses a serious paradox for the customary 
account of animal aggression. If the function of aggressive displays is to influence 
or manipulate the behavior of one's opponent, they must not provide truthful 
information about concealed abilities. If displays do not provide truthful infor- 
mation, they will evolve to a uniform expression of maximum intensity. Since 
such behavior is uninformative of the capabilities of the signaller, the display will 
be ignored by the receiver and fail to influence its behavior. The only reliable 
information about an opponent's invisible aggressive attributes, therefore, is 
obtained by challenging him to combat, and this essentially obviates the pre- 
sumed adaptive significance of display. The result is a paradox: if displays are not 
truthful, they cannot have been selected for; if they were selected for communica- 
tion, they cannot be truthful. 
The response of many ethologists has simply been to deny the paradoxical 
conclusion. They argue that graded signals do occur and are sufficiently predic- 
tive of the future behavior of the displaying animal, provided that one correctly 
interprets the conditional and probabilistic nature of the message (HINDE 1981; 
SMITH 1986; BARLOW & ROWELL 1984; VAN RHIJN 1980). Hence, displays do, in 
fact, provide valid information about the displaying individual. The implication is 
that the paradox is some sort of artifact of the game theory approach or  the result 
of overlooking additional factors, such as the occurrence of repeated encounters 
between individuals that can remember and recognize one another (VAN RHIJN 
1980; VAN RHIJN & VODEGEL 1980). 
These arguments have considerable force, and they clearly indicate that the 
inference from the game theory models must be incorrect. This does not, 
however, fully address the source of the problem. The paradox owes nothing to 
game theory, as such. The theorists simply encountered it in the course of 
developing a rigorous account of the evolution of displays. If the inferences from 
this account are at variance with real-world observations, there must be an error 
in the underlying premises, in the assumptions involved in the customary view of 
animal conflict. 
I believe that there are two crucial assumptions in the customary view that 
require modification to resolve the paradox: that graded displays present valid 
information about the internal state of the displaying animal and that the display 
of such information is, in fact, the central function of the behavior. In this paper, 
I will propose a modification of the first assumption, accepting a version of the 
Natural Superiority of Deceit. I will, however, argue that deceit is subject to 
stabilizing selection, and that it will not, in general, become fixed at maximum 
levels. In a companion article (BOND 1989)' I will address the second assumption 
in the light of the arguments of the game theorists that the level of aggressive 
motivation ought not to be expressed in displays. 
The Argument for Optimal Deceit 
The argument of the Natural Superiority of Deceit derives from a considera- 
tion of the fitness payoffs for the displaying individual. It appears to ignore, 
however, the selective factors that operate on the receiver of misinformation. The 
possibility of "deceit," in the simple sense of a disparity between true and 
displayed capabilities (MITCHELL 1986), may select against veracity, but it also 
selects strongly against credulity. In the absence of direct means of verification, 
there is always a selective advantage to a certain amount of healthy skepticism. 
In a poker game, the bets of a persistent bluffer will eventually be ignored. 
His opponents will come to play against him only on the basis of prior 
probabilities, thereby elevating the likelihood that his bluff will be called by a 
player with a superior hand. In the long run, a persistent bluffer will lose. By 
analogy, it can be argued that any increment in deceit in a communication system 
will select for increased skepticism, thereby reducing the selective value of deceit. 
Deceit, by this reasoning, is subject to stabilizing selection, thereby preventing 
the postulated fixation of completely uninformative displays. Similar arguments 
have been proposed by ZAHAVI (1981), MOYNIHAN (1982), and SMITH (1986). 
When the game model is extended to incorporate these features, it generates 
a novel perspective on the role of deceit in animal conflict. At least some of the 
time, a deceitful display will cause a rival to back down, when in fact he would 
have won in an escalated battle. There is, therefore, a selective disadvantage to 
absolute truthfulness. Extravagant or excessively frequent deceit will select for 
skepticism, however, and increase the likelihood that the veracity of the display 
will be tested by escalation. Since escalation is costly to both parties, wholly 
noninformative displays ought also to be selected against. The inference seems 
clear that there should be some optimal level of misinformation in displays that 
will provide the maximum degree of undeserved success while minimizing the 
cost of elicited escalations. 
Most previous game theoretical models have assumed that each participant 
accurately assesses the other's fighting ability, presumably by means of displays 
that cannot readily be faked (PARKER 1974; HAMMERSTEIN 1981; MAYNARD SMITH 
1982). When imperfect knowledge has been assumed, as with a number of 
extensions to MAYNARD SMITH'S (1974) uwar of attrition" model, the concern has 
been with the costs of verification through brief, probing episodes of active 
combat, rather than with variation in the information content of the display 
(PARKER & RUBENSTEIN 1981 ; HAMMERSTEIN & PARKER 1982). The existing 
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Fig. 1: Payoff matrix. Fighting ability for Signaller = Vs; Signaller 
fighting ability for Receiver = VR. Signaller strategies and 
payoffs are shown in Roman type; Receiver strategies and X<VR X>% 
payoffs are in italics 
literature on game theoretical analysis of aggression has not, therefore, addressed 
the possibility of "optimal deceit." To test this inference requires the develop- 
ment of a novel game formalism, one that includes the possibility of deceit as an 
explicit and central feature. 
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We will begin by imagining an aggressive interaction between two individu- 
als. We will assume that they have had no prior experience of one another, and 
that they are entirely evenly matched in apparent physical capabilities. The 
outcome of an escalated battle will, therefore, depend solely on concealed, 
internal factors, such as disposition and experience. We will represent these 
factors by a variable, V, which we will call "fighting ability." In this model, V will 
be treated as an integer variable with values between 1 and 10. 
The focus of the model is a single transfer of information: the Signaller, who 
is assumed to be in possession of the resource in contention, generates a graded 
display that may be more or less indicative of his actual level of concealed fighting 
ability. The display, V*, is also represented as an integer between 1 and 10. The 
Receiver must then make a decision, given a knowledge of his own fighting ability 
and the probable level of deceit being employed, whether to challenge the 
Signaller and escalate to full-scale combat or to withdraw. We will assume that, in 
the absence of any other information, the Receiver will treat all levels of V as 
being equally probable, which is to say that the a priori odds distribution is 
uniform. 
The Receiver's decision is formulated on the basis of the payoff matrix in 
Fig. 1. If he withdraws, he loses some quantity, L, and the Signaller gains a 
quantity, W, irrespective of their relative fighting ability. This corresponds to the 
Signaller's being left in possession of the resource, while the Receiver has to look 
for resources elsewhere. When the Receiver chooses to challenge, the winner is 
the individual with the higher level of V; in case of ties, the decision goes to the 
Signaller. There is a cost to challenging, however: a factor, C, which corresponds 
to the risk of being injured in an escalated conflict, that is subtracted from the 
payoffs for both participants. Except for the cost factor, which renders this a non- 
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zero-sum game, the model is formally equivalent to Liar's Poker, a contest based 
on the poker hands formed from the serial numbers on a dollar bill (I owe this 
insight to R. H. WILKINSON). 
The only way the Receiver can win is to challenge when his fighting ability is 
higher, but losing on a challenge is more expensive than withdrawing. The 
Receiver's preferred strategy is, therefore, a function of the relative ability 
ranking: when he possesses a higher value of V than the Signaller, he should 
challenge; otherwise, he should withdraw. The behavior of the Receiver will, 
therefore, be strongly influenced by the amount of information that he can extract 
from the Signaller's display, and the Signaller is in a position to manipulate the 
Receiver's choice to his own advantage by altering the truthfulness of his display. 
Even when the Signaller has a higher level of fighting ability, he should 
prefer to win by convincing the Receiver to withdraw, since winning o n  a 
withdrawal is more profitable than winning on a challenge. This implies that the  
Signaller should avoid concealing a high value of V, since such behavior would 
only encourage the Receiver to challenge him, thereby reducing the magnitude of 
the Signaller's reward. The only rational form of deception in this game, 
therefore, is exaggeration. The success of an exaggeration strategy depends 
critically on the credulity of the Receiver, however. If the displays of the Signaller 
come to bear too little relationship to reality, the Receiver -will simply ignore 
them and play the game on the basis of the a priori odds. 
Three Simple Display Strategies 
The dynamics of this contest can be roughly illustrated by calculating the 
expected payoff for each participant that results from each of three simple display 
strategies: veracity, noninformation, and a deception strategy that results in a 
small, consistent probability that the Receiver will withdraw when he would have 
won an escalated interaction. The details of the computation are provided in 
Appendix A. 
If the Signaller is always truthful, the Receiver will always withdraw when 
he would lose on a challenge and always challenge when his V level is higher; his 
expected payoff is at a maximum with this strategy. The Signaller can improve his 
expectation substantially, however, if he can, by means of bluff or exaggeration, 
dupe the Receiver into withdrawing more often. For a rough estimation, we will 
assume that 10 % of the contests the Signaller would otherwise have lost might be 
turned to wins by exaggeration. The consequences of the third strategy, nonin- 
formation, will depend on the Receiver's evaluation of the a priori odds. 
The relative effects of these three strategies can be visualized by evaluating 
the expected payoffs for Signaller and Receiver for specific values of the payoff 
parameters. To illustrate we assume L = W = 5 and evaluate the payoff 
expectations for both participants for three levels of C: 0.3 (= Low Cost), 0.9 (= 
Medium Cost), and 3.0 (= High Cost) (Table 1). 
Note that the 10 %-deceit strategy is preferable to either absolute veracity or 
noninformation at both low and medium levels of cost. Only at the high-cost 
level is the noninformative strategy preferred, and even then the preference only 
Optimal Deceit in Aggressive Displays 35 
Table 1: Expected Payoffs for three simple strategies for different costs of challenging 
Low Cost: C = 0.3 
Payoffs 
S~gnaller Receiver 
Truth +0.365 -0.635 
10 O O  Deceit f0.829 -1.072 
No Information f0.230 -0.770 
Medium Cost: C = 0.9 
Payoffs 
Signaller Receiver 
Truth +0.095 -0.905 
10 90 Deceit +0.586 -1.315 
No Information -0.310 -1.310 
High Cost: C = 3.0 
Payoffs 
Signaller Receiver 
Truth -0.850 -1.850 
10 O~O Deceit -0.265 -2.165 
No Information +0.250 -3.250 
i 
reflects the limited number of alternatives being considered. If the expected 
payoff had been computed for a 20 %, rather than a 10 %, success rate, deception 
would have been preferred to noninformation even under the high-cost condi- 
tion. A numerical exploration of this model of aggressive communication thus 
appears likely to provide a reasonable evaluation of the hypothesis of optimal 
deceit. 
A Simulation of Deceitful Communication 
An effective bluffing strategy must contain a stochastic component; the 
Receiver must never be certain of just how much exaggeration is taking place. To 
simulate this feature of the model, I have assumed that the degree of overstate- 
ment is distributed as a Poisson variable. If the Signaller's fighting ability is VS, 
the probability of a display of Vi' is a function of the difference between the 
display and the true value. The generating parameter of the Poisson distribution, 
x, represents the expected value of this disparity and will be termed the "exaggera- 
tion factor." Details of the algorithm are provided in Appendix B. 
The behavior of this function corresponds well to what we would wish from 
a measure of deceit. When x = 0, the Signaller always states the truth about his 
concealed abilities. As x increases, the probability converges to 1 of declaring V 
= 10, independently of the value of Vs, thereby providing no useful information 
to the Receiver. Since x is always positive in a Poisson distribution, the Signaller 
will never undervalue his own abilities.' 
Fig. 2: Aggregate probability of the 
Receiver's withdrawal (1 -PIC)) 
across all possible values of Signal- 
ler ability (VS) for six different 
levels of exaggeration factor (x)). 
Payoff matrix used: L = 5; W = 5; 
C = 0.9 
Signaller Ability ( V, ) 
To model the response of the Receiver, we begin by assuming that he knows 
the exaggeration factor, x, being employed by the Signaller, as well as the value of 
V". From these two sources of information, the Receiver can construct a 
retrospective probability distribution for the true value of Vs. Given the retro- 
spective distribution and a knowledge of his own fighting ability, VR, the 
Receiver can then estimate the probability that the Signaller would win on a 
challenge. The Receiver can then use this probability, in combination with the 
payoff matrix, to determine his actions. (A full description of the decision 
algorithm is provided in Appendix B.) 
The Receiver's behavior, thus, is essentially deterministic. Given the payoff 
matrix, the exaggeration factor, and the Signaller's display, the probability that 
the Receiver will challenge or withdraw is uniquely specified. Notice in Fig. 2 
that for low exaggeration factors (x = 0.5 or 1.0), the Receiver places a great deal 
of credence in the Signaller's display, and the probability that the Receiver will 
withdraw increases almost linearly with the Signaller's fighting ability, Vs. As the 
exaggeration factor increases, the slope of the curve declines, indicating a reduc- 
tion in the probability of withdrawal for higher values of Vs and an increase in 
withdrawal probability for lower ones. For x = 16, the curve is flat, indicating 
that there is virtually no information in the Signaller's display, and the Receiver 
challenges or withdraws entirely on the basis of prior probabilities. The behavior 
of the model system is, thus, much as was postulated in the introductory 
argument. 
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When the expected payoff is graphed as a function of exaggeration factor for 
each level of Signaller ability (Fig. 3), the optimum exaggeration factor, defined as 
the least extreme value that will produce the maximum payoff expectation, can be 
determined by a simple iterative search. Hence, the Signaller does best to employ 
the literal truth when his fighting ability is 10 and to exaggerate maximally with an 
ability of 1 or 2. For Vs values of from 3 to 9, however, the payoff to the Signaller 
was optimized at an intermediate level of exaggeration, with clear decreases 
resulting from exaggeration factors above and below the optimum. The optimum 
exaggeration factor appears to be roughly a logarithmic function of V,, as is 
indicated by the scaling of the x axis in Fig. 3. 
The sensitivity of the optimum exaggeration level to the payoff matrix is 
displayed in Fig. 4. The behavior of the model is a function of the Receiver's 
decision, which, in turn, is a function of Vc, the Bayesian critical value of the 
Receiver's fighting ability. As shown in Appendix A, this value is a simple 
function of the cost of challenging, C, and the sum of basic win and loss payoffs, 
(L + W). It therefore appears that the full spectrum of effects of variation in 
payoff values can be displayed by setting (L + W) to a constant value (arbitrarily, 
10) and varying C over the range (0, 10). The optimum exaggeration factor for 
each value of Vs was computed for each payoff combination and plotted in 
Figure 4. The optimum exaggeration factor increased with C for all values of Vs, 
but the slope of the function was reduced with increasing levels of Signaller 
ability. 
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Fig. 3: Plot of expected payoff to the Signal- 
ler (Ed, as a function of exaggeration factor 
(x), for each possible value of fighting ability 4.0 
(VS). Least extreme maxima are plotted as 
filled circles. A m e  optimum value was 
found for all values of Vs between 3 to 9. & ' 
Payoff matrix used: L = 5; W = 5; C = 0.9 
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Optimization in the Absence of Complete Knowledge 
So far we have assumed that the exaggeration factor employed in generating 
the display was known beforehand to both parties. Although the Receiver did not 
know how much exaggeration was involved on any given occasion, he had a 
reliable knowledge of the average level. The Receiver's behavior thus involved a 
simple extrapolation from two known parameters. This assumption of complete 
knowledge of the underlying display strategy is unrealistic, however. To know 
that optimal deceit may be operating in the real world, we need to assess the 
stability of the communication system when the Receiver cannot be assured of the 
average level of exaggeration being employed. 
The elimination of the constraint of complete knowledge requires creating 
two exaggeration factors, one for each participant. As before, the Signaller's 
factor, x, determines the relationship between Vs and V*. The Receiver's exagger- 
ation factor, y, represents the value that he believes the Signaller to be using; the 
Receiver's factor will then determine his retrospective probability distribution 
and his likelihood of challenging or withdrawing. We can then simultaneously 
vary the exaggeration practiced by the Signaller and that anticipated by the 
Receiver over a range of values and compare the expected payoffs for each 
participant at adjacent points in the range. 
The analysis is complicated, however, by the fact that variation in the 
exaggeration factor has a much larger effect on the expected payoff at low levels of 
fighting ability (Fig. 3). If the effects of a single value of x or y are averaged across 
all levels of V, the pattern for V = 1 or 2 will dominate the results. What we 
require is an expression for an "exaggeration strategy," a function that corrects 
for the differential effects of V on the range of payoff values. Each strategy level 
will then represent not a single exaggeration factor, but an array of factors, one 
for each level of fighting ability. 
A standard means of controlling for the influence of an auxiliary variable is 
multivariate regression. In this case, the regression is performed on the data in 
Fig. 4, in which the optimal exaggeration factor appears to vary log-linearly with 
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C for each value of Vs. If log (x,,I) is subjected to analysis of covariance, we can 
extract a function that relates opt~mal exaggeration rate to C, controlling for V. 
The resulting model provides a different intercept for each value of V, ranging 
from 2.49 to -1.18 for progressively larger V, but a constant slope of 0.187. 
Using this relationship as an underlying rule, we can generate a family of 
exaggeration strategies, S, where the exaggeration factor to be used at each level of 
V is computed from log [x(V)] = .187S + fw), where f is the array of intercepts 
from the analysis of covariance. The mean expected payoff from S across all 
values of V is, thus, an unbiased indication of the effects of a particular 
exaggeration strategy. 
The results of independent strategic decisions are most readily displayed in a 
two-dimensional vector diagram, in which the magnitude and direction of payoff 
differences along the Signaller and Receiver axes describe the direction of move- 
ment of the system under unconstrained conditions. If, for example, the system is 
at some specified point, (SR, SS), and the expectation of the Receiver, ER, can be 
increased by increasing the exaggeration he assumes the Signaller to be practicing 
(i.e. ER[SR, Ss] < ER[SR + 6, SS]), then the relative payoffs of the Receiver will 
generate a vector parallel to the Receiver axis, in a positive direction, with a length 
proportionate to the difference between the Receiver's expectations at adjacent 
strategies. Similarly, differences in Signaller payoff expectations will generate 
vectors parallel to the Signaller axis. For any point, (SR, SS), the two vectors 
operate simultaneously, yielding a resultant that describes the direction and 
velocity of movement of the system within the strategy space. 
The consequence of applying this computation to a wide variety of possible 
strategy combinations is the generation of vector diagrams similar to those used to 
describe predatodprey systems in community ecology (ROUGHGARDEN 1979). If 
the communication system is stable, the two participants, by adjusting their 
respective exaggeration strategies to maximize their own expected payoffs, should 
converge to a single common value. If, on the contrary, it is unstable, as predicted 
by the Natural Superiority of Deceit, both exaggeration strategies should quickly 
become fixed at the high end of the scale. Vector diagrams were generated using a 
range of S values from -5 to +5 for three different levels of C (Fig. 5). In each 
case, a unique, central equilibrium point is evident. 
Discussion 
The numerical simulation of our model of animal conflict strongly supports 
the hypothesis of an optimal level of deceit in aggressive communication. 
Although there is a clear advantage to exaggerating one's fighting ability to 
dissuade other animals from escalating the conflict to potentially damaging levels, 
displays must retain a sufficient level of information to convince the opposing 
party to attend to them. The postulated Natural Superiority of Deceit is, in these 
terms, limited, and we can conceive of animal displays as containing a mixture of 
correct and misleading information. 
Provided that both participants adhere to  an ability-compensated rule for 
pe ra t ing  exaggeration strategies, moreover, the information content of the 
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display should be expected to converge on an equilibrium value, even in the 
absence of perfect knowledge of which strategy the other animal is pursuing. The 
common generating rule is not as restrictive a limitation as one might imagine: it 
amounts to constraining the animals to behave consistently across the possible 
range of concealed abilities. Such limiting rules are a common feature of game 
theoretic analyses (MAYNARD SMITH 1984). 
As in a predator-prey system, the equilibrium will be unstable: the Signaller 
can always better his payoff by doing something other than what the Receiver 
expects. What maintains the equilibrium is that any change in exaggeration 
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strategy generates opposing tendencies in the other individual's expectations that 
drive the system back toward its initial conditions. 
"Evolutionary stability," in the strict sense of MAYNARD SMITH (1974), 
entails that one strategy or mix of strategies, when adopted by an entire 
population, will be superior to all competing alternatives. The model we have 
used to illustrate optimal deceit is not a population game, but rather a game of 
individual strategic choices. The applicability of MAYNARD SMITH'S concept is, 
therefore, necessarily indirect. It appears, however, that in a large population of 
individuals, alternately playing Signaller and Receiver, the strategy choices of all 
participants should converge to a predictable value over time. In this loose sense, 
optimal deceit may be evolutionarily stable. 
It is a striking feature of these results that the equilibria1 value is less, at all 
three levels of cost of challenging, than would have been the case if the Receiver 
had known what exaggeration strategy was being applied (Fig. 5). This suggests 
that lack of information in a communicatory system may have a conservative 
effect. The greater the ignorance of the Receiver, the more truthful the Signaller 
must be if he is to be successful in manipulating the Receiver's behavior. 
Several other considerations also point to the possibility that levels of 
deception may be minimized in the real world. The game theory argument hinges 
on the assumption that escalation to actual combat is a costly and potentially 
damaging event for both sides. Escalation is not irreversible, however. Attacks 
can often be evaded or successfully defended against (GEIST 1974). Under many 
circumstances, attacks can be of brief duration, with both combatants quickly 
withdrawing and resuming aggressive displays. The cost of such "probing" bouts 
of combat could be fairly negligible, in which case, the optimal exaggeration 
levels would be reduced (Fig. 4). VAN RHIJN (1980; VAN RHIJN & VODEGEL 1980) 
has pointed out, in addition, that the possibility of repeated probing battles 
between individuals who can recognize and remember their opponents on 
subsequent occasions makes deception extremely difficult to sustain. It appears, 
therefore, that although optimal deceit is a real theoretical possibility, it may only 
be realized in nature in circumstances in which an individual's fighting ability 
fluctuates significantly over time (CALDWELL 1986). 
Approaches for Further Research 
The simplest prediction of the optimal deceit model that can readily be 
applied to real-world behavior is that some exaggeration ought to be detectable in 
aggressive displays, in that victories based on display alone should bear a looser 
relationship to the relative fighting ability of the two participants than those that 
result from escalated combat. One approach to testing this hypothesis would 
make use of staged encounters, analyzing their results with logistic regression 
(Cox 1970; BARLOW 1983). 
Using a species in which escalation was commonly involved in aggressive 
encounters, but which at least occasionally resolved conflicts by display alone, 
one would plot the probability of victory against some composite indicator of 
actual fighting ability. BARLOW et al. (1986) have recently published experiments 
Fig. 6: Hypothetical relationships between 
fighring ability and the probability of win- 
ning an aggressive encounter for three pos- 
sible experimental outcomes. In each case, 
the solid sigmoidal curve represents con- 
flicts that were resolved by escalation 
while the dashed curves represent conflic 
resolved by display alone. Case A: th 
logistic regression coefficients are signifi 
cantly positive for both solid and dashe 
curves, but they do not differ significant 
from one another (evidence of truthful dis' 
plays). Case B: both coefficients are signifi. 
c a y  positive and different from on 
another (evidence of partially informativ 
displays). Case C: coefficient for soli 
curve is significantly positive, while tho 
I for dashed k r v e  dois not differ from zen Relative Fighting Ability (evidence of noninformative displays) 
directed to this type of analysis. To test for the occurrence of deceit, data woul 
be plotted separately for contests that were resolved by display alone and fo 
those that were escalated to physical combat. Hypothetical curves for thre 
possible outcomes of this experiment are shown in Fig. 6. 
Assuming that the measure of fighting ability used is adequate, the curve fo 
escalated conflicts (solid line in Fig. 6) should have a significantly positiv 
regression coefficient, implying that animals that are better fighters tend to wi 
escalated conflicts. The differences among the three outcomes lie in their predic 
tions for the display-only curve (dashed lines in Fig. 6). If aggressive displays ar 
essentially noninformative, the probability of winning a display-only conflic 
should be independent of relative fighting ability (Line C in Fig. 6), and th 
logistic regression coefficient should not differ significantly from zero. If display 
are fully as informative of fighting ability as an animal's actual performance i 
combat, the escalated and display-only curves should both have positive coeffi 
cients, but should not differ significantly from one another (Line A in Fig. 6) 
Evidence for exaggeration would fall between these two extremes: the regressio 
coefficient for both curves should be significantly positive, but that for th 
display-only results should be significantly smaller, indicating that fighting abilit, 
is less strongly related to success in a purely conventional conflict (Line B i 
Fig. 6). 
Appendix A: The Expectation from Three Simple Strategies 
1. Expectation from Veracity 
There are 100 possible combinations of concealed ability values, of which th 
Receiver would win on 45 in a showdown. If the Signaller displays truthfully, th 
Receiver will always withdraw when he would lose on a challenge and alway 
challenge when his V level is higher. The expected payoff to the Signaller from 
policy of strict honesty is, thus, Es = 0.01 (55W-45L-45C), while that to th 
Receiver is ER = 0.01 (45W-55L-45C). 
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2. Expectation from 10 % Deceit 
consider that 10 % of the contests the Signaller would otherwise have lost 
might be turned to wins by exaggeration. Then, Es = 0.01 
(59.5W-40.5L-40.5C) and ER = 0.01 (40.5W-59.5L-40.5C). 
3. Expectation from Noninformation 
The consequences of noninformation are more complicated, since they 
reflect the Receiver's evaluation of the a priori odds. If the probability that the 
Signaller would win on a challenge is P{w) = P{VslVR), and if the probability 
distribution of Vs is assumed to be uniform, then P{w) = (ll-VR)/lO. The 
expected payoff to the Receiver on a challenge is 
P{w) (-L-C) + (1 -P{w)) (W-C). 
By employing a Bayes criterion, the Receiver should challenge whenever this is 
greater than -L and withdraw otherwise (CHERNOFF & MOSES 1959). This defines 
a critical value of P{w) for the Receiver's decision, wc: 
P{w} (-L-C) + (I-P{w)) (W-C) < -L 
P{w} (L+W) < L+W-C 
Since the Receiver possesses only a knowledge of the value of his own concealed 
ability , VR, wc translates directly into a critical value, Vc, which is the largest 
integer less than or equal to (L+W+lOC)/(L+W). In the noninformation 
strategy, the Receiver will attack when VR>VC and withdraw otherwise. 
If the probability that the Receiver will challenge the Signaller is P{c), then 
the probability of a withdrawal is (1-P{c)). This must be equivalent, by the 
reasoning above, to Vc/lO, so the Receiver will challenge on lO(10-Vc) of the 100 
possible ability combinations. O n  the occasion of a challenge, the Signaller will 
have a concealed ability of Vc or less Vc/10 of the time and will lose in the 
showdown. This will occur in lO(10-Vc) (VJIO) = Vc(lO-Vc) of the chal- 
lenges. The number of possible challenges remaining is lO(10-Vc) (1 -Vc/lO) = 
(10-Vc)2. Of these, the Signaller will win (10-Vc) by tieing the Receiver and will 
better the Receiver on half of the remainder, or  [(lo-Vc)* - (10-Vc)]/2. The 
probability that the Signaller will win on a challenge is, thus: 
The expected payoff to the Signaller of a noninfomation strategy is: 
Es = (I-P{c)) W + P{c) [P{wIc) (W-C) + (I-P{w~c)) (-L-C)] 
Substituting, 
9+vc (W-C) + -(-L-C) 
10 20 I 
Collecting terms, 
A similar reasoning produces 
An idea of the relative effects of these three strategies can now be obtained b 
evaluating Es and ER for specific values of the payoff parameters. 
Appendix B : The Simulation Algorithm 
1. The Strategy of the Signaller 
I have assumed that the degree of exaggeration is distributed as a Poisso 
variate. If the Signaller has a concealed ability of Vs, the probability of a display 
V ' i s  a function of the difference between the display and the true ability val 
(D = V" - Vs). The generating parameter, x, represents the expected value 
this disparity and will be termed the "exaggeration factor." For v<lO,  
I0 D<O 
where x is rational and nonnegative. Since 10 is the upper limit of conceale 
ability, P{V* = 10) consists of the pooled residual probability of the upper tail 
the function: i = 9  
P{V* = 10IVs) = 1 - Z P{ilVs) 
i = l  
2. The Response of the Receiver 
From a knowledge of the exaggeration factor being employed, the Receiv 
constructs a retros~ective ~robabilitv distribution of the true value of t 
Signaller's concealed abilities: 
P{VIVs) 
P{VSlV"} = 
, = rn 
Given the retrospective distribution and a knowledge of his own conceale 
ability, VR, the Receiver can then estimate the probability that the Signaller woul 
win if challenged, P{w), as the sum of retrospective probabilities of ability leve 
greater than or equal to VR: 
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From a knowledge of P{w), the Receiver could then apply a Bayes strategy, 
as described in Appendix A, and challenge whenever his expected payoff on a 
challenge was greater than -L. This defines wc, the critical value of P{w) for the 
Receiver's decision. Aside from its methodological simplicity, however, there is 
no good reason to adopt a rigid Bayes criterion. The use of a Bayes criterion 
postulates a precision in the Receiver's knowledge of the underlying process that 
is wholly unrealistic. When the true values of x, Vs, and VR are subject to variance 
in estimation, as they would be in the real world, the probability of challenging or 
withdrawing will never be 1 or 0. 
A less stringent assumption is a probabilistic relationship between P{w) and 
the probability of a challenge, P{c), with Pic) varying smoothly, rather than 
discontinuously, between 0 and 1. At P{w) = wc, the options of challenging and 
withdrawing are exactly equal in their expected payoffs. We would, thus, expect 
the Receiver to challenge, under these circumstances, 50 % of the time. As P{w) 
increases from the critical point, P{c) should decrease, approaching O when 
p{w) = 1; as P{w) decreases, P{c) should increase, becoming 1 when 
P{w) = 0. Between these predetermined points, the transformation function 
should be smooth and monotonic. Any function possessing these attributes 
would serve the purpose, but aesthetics dictate that it also be symmetrical around 
P{w> = Pic). 
One curve that fits these constraints is a quadratic: 
P{c)' + a Pic) P{w) + P{w)' = 1 
Since we know that the curve must pass through (112, wC), we can derive 
For values of C < (L+W)/2, the quadratic transformation function is ill-con- 
ditioned, generating probabilities greater than 1. In these cases, therefore, the 
inverse function was used: 
(I -P{w))' + b(I -P{w)) (I-P{c)) + (I  -P{c)) = I.  
When compared with the results of using a Bayes criterion, this transforma- 
tion smooths the expected value curves and enhances our ability to detect optima, 
but it does not alter the essentially deterministic nature of the Receiver's behavior. 
Given the payoff matrix, the exaggeration factor, and the Signaller's display, the 
probability that the Receiver will challenge or withdraw is uniquely specified. 
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